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Article 4

RECENT CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw-BANKS

AND

BANKING-A

general

creditor

brought the action in behalf of the other creditors against a shareholder
of a defunct bank to enforce the double liability laid down by See. 6, Art.
11, Constitution, Sec. 212 Burns Ann. St., 1926, stating that "stockholders
in every bank or banking corporation shall be individually responsible to
an amount over and above their stock, equal to their respective shares of
stock, for all debts and liabilities of said bank or banking company." The
defendant shareholder filed a demurrer alleging insufficient facts were
stated. Demurrer was upheld and plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed. (1)
The provision applies to banks of deposit as well as to banks of issue; (2)
The constitutional provision was self-executing, and no means of enforcement was necessary. Gaiser v. Buck, Supreme Court of Indiana, Dec. 12,
1930, 174 N. E. 83.
A bank is an association or corporation whose business is to receive
money on deposit, cash checks and drafts, discount paper, make loans and
issue promissory notes payable to bearer called bank notes. Words and
Phrases, Vol. 1, 776. Banks are classified as follows: (1) Banks of deposits including savings banks, (2) Banks of discount, being those which
loan money on collateral or by means of discount, (3) Banks of circulation
which issue bank notes payable to bearer. Bank v. Collector, 3 Wall., 485,
18 L. Ed. 207. At common law shareholders in banks as in other corporations were not liable for any debts in excess of the assets. Toner v. Fulkerson, 125 Ind. 224; Shaw v. Boylon, 16 Ind. 384. In determining whether
the corporation is a banking institution the court will look to the articles
of incorporation, its declared objects, the character of the business, and
the construction placed on its charter powers by the officers. Hamilton
Nat. Bank v. Am. L. & T. Co., 66 Nebr. 671, 92 N. E., 189. The result,
that the provision covered banks of deposit and discount as well as those
of issue, seems both correct and proper under the definations and rules.
The connotation of the word "banks" is enough to include the banks of
deposit as well as issue, contrary to the contention of the defendant.
The court here held the constitutional provision to be self-executory
which is generally so held when there is a manifest intent that the provisions should go into immediate effect and no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of the right given, whereas when principles are
indicated, without laying down rules by means of which those principles
can be given the force of law, the courts have generally considered the
provisions as not self-executing. 6 R. C. L.; 58 Cooley Constitutional
Limitations, 122. A popular example is the 15th Amendment of the Federal Constitution for it abolishes all distinctions based on "race, color, or
previous condition of servitude" and its further provisions that "Congress
shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation" indicates
that the rule may not be sufficiently comprehensive to protect the right to
suffrage and that legislation may be necessary. The "double liability"
clause, although self-executing, does not preclude placing even higher liability on the shareholders. Foster v. Row, 120 Mich. 1, 79 N. W. 696.
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The court in deciding that the provisions were self-executing and that
they applied to banks of deposit as well as issue is a practical interpretation
of the Indiana Constitution and follows the decided weight of authority
in other states that have very similar provisions. Brodie v. Pollock, 110
Nebr. 844, 195 N. W. 457; Dupey v. Swigert, 127 Ill. 294, 21 N. E. 622;
Austin v. Campbell, (Texas) 210 S. W. 277.
R. R. D.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS ON ASSESSMENT
RoLL-The board of public works on November 9, 1915 approved a final
assessment roll on the real estate of the appellees, among others, delivered
it to the comptroller of Indianapolis, and issued a duplicate to the treasurer
of the said city. Notices of final assessment were sent to the property
owners, including appellees. After this the board undertook to make and
adopt a supplementary or modified assessment roll without notice to or
consent of appellees and they set this up as a defense in this action to
foreclose the improvement lien, which is for the paving and curbing ol
West Tenth street in Indianapolis. Held, the supplementary assessment
roll was invalid; judgment for appellees affirmed. Butner v. McQuillin,
Appellate Court of Indiana, Sept. 25, 1930, 172 N. E. 658.
In its opinion the court said: "The facts of this case are similar in
all essential respects to the case of Vandergrifft (Board of Public Works)
v. State ex rel. Sudbrock, 199 Ind. 210, 156 N. E. 465 . . . and upon the
authority of that case the judgment is affirmed." In that case which concerned appropriation of land for widening a street, the board of public
works after finally approving the assessment roll which awarded Sudbrock
$1,400 damages and $140 benefits, sent to the finance department of the
city a final assessment roll which showed that Sudbrock was awarded only
$1,000 damages and assessed benefits amounting to $500. When he protested, the board refused to deliver a true and correct copy of the original
assessment roll to the finance department, but instead attempted to rescind
the entire improvement scheme and all proceedings under it. The Supreme
Court held it could not do this, being a court of special or limited jurisdiction, and that it was bound to transmit to the finance department a true
copy of the assessment roll that it first approved. This case was governed
by the statutes relating to appropriation of property, sections 8704-8706,
8709, Burns' Supp. 1921; which are sections 10355, 10357, 10360 Burns Ann.
St. 1926. These sections provide that the assessment or award shall attach
to each piece of property and notice thereof be given to the owner; that he
shall remonstrate if he chooses; that after remonstrances have been received the board shall sustain or modify the assessments or awards and
from this action the property owner may appeal to the courts; that on
completion of such assessment roll the board shall deliver it to the department of finance, from which time the benefits, if in. excess of the damages,
shall be a lien on the property next to taxes; and that the person awarded
damages in excess of benefits is entitled to a warrant from the finance
department drawn on the city treasurer.
While the Vandergrifft case concerned the appropriation of property,
the instant case concerns only the improvement of a street already laid
out. Hence, although they were not cited in the opinion, the statutes which
should govern this case must be those relating to street improvement, sec-

